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ABSTRACT 
This article provides an empirical investigation of the effects of the ownership and organizational structure 
on the performance of cultural institutions. More specifically, we consider how museums are effective in 
their function of disseminating culture to audiences and contributing to the local development. By exploiting 
a unique data set based on the 2011 census of Italian museums, we develop indexes of accessibility, visitors’ 
experience, web visibility and promotion of the local cultural context. Using count data models, we regress 
such measures on the type of organization. We distinguish between governmental museums, public museums 
whose administration is either outsourced or has financial autonomy and private museums. We control for 
the most salient characteristics of a museum, competition pressure and some proxies of potential audience. 
Our evidence shows that private museums, public museums with financial autonomy and outsourced 
museums outperform public museums run as sub-units of culture departments. This paper contributes to the 
cultural economics, policy and public administration literature by adding insights into the effect of 
outsourcing and administrative decentralization in the public cultural sector. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this article is to analyse how ownership structure and organizational form influence the 
effectiveness of museums in their provision of public services. Specifically, we focus on their 
mission to enhance audience’s experience and promote the local context.  
In the last decades, museums have undergone radical transformations. Once their mission was 
mainly focused on traditional activities such as preservation, interpretation and scholarship of their 
collections. Recently it has been more and more oriented toward communication and exhibition. 
They dedicate special attention to both visitors’ needs and the social and economic impact on the 
local community (Weil 1995, 1999; Anderson 2004). 
Meanwhile the debate on government’s intervention and performance in public service delivery has 
invested public museums. Scarcity of fiscal resources and an ideological shift in cultural policies 
have caused public museums to witness budget restrictions in many countries. This has favoured 
new strategies such as audience development and engagement, efficient management and attention 
to additional financial sources like sponsorships and donations (O’Hagan 1998). There has also 
been a growing awareness of the need to use specific accountability instruments and reporting 
methods vis-à-vis stakeholders. For instance, it is not surprising that new paradigms, such as that of 
public value, have taken hold in the arts and cultural policy debate as a means to make cultural 
services provision more efficient or accountable (Throsby 2010; Scott 2016).  
Within this debate, the question is often addressed whether the ownership and organizational modes 
of cultural institutions may make a difference in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. This 
notwithstanding, there is little empirical quantitative evidence in the cultural economic literature on 
the effects of ownership structure and organizational form on museums’ performance, and 
particularly on effectiveness.   
Here we focus on the Italian context, which is particularly illustrative as it presents a large number 
of heritage institutions characterized by heterogeneity in both ownership structure and 
organizational forms. Traditionally Italian museums have been mainly public institutions managed 
under a state provision model by national or local government authorities. Since the mid-nineties 
several policy reforms have eased outsourcing practices and new, more decentralised organizational 
arrangements for public museum management. At the same time, private museums have 
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proliferated. 
In our empirical analysis, we exploit a unique dataset based on the Italian National Statistical Office 
2011 Museum Census – more than 2,500 units, including monuments and archaeological sites. We 
construct a set of indices of museum effectiveness in public service provision. They are related to 
four aspects of a museum’s supply (accessibility, facilitation of visitors’ experience, web visibility 
and relationship with the local context) and implode information on whether relevant activities and 
services were provided or not. These activities and services help museums achieve their core 
missions to improve public welfare by promoting, exhibiting and communicating heritage for the 
purposes of education, study and enjoyment and to be a catalyst for local development. We then 
build an overall index of effectiveness as the sum of the four indices.  
Using count data models, we regress these variables on the type of museum organization: we 
distinguish between governmental museums (i.e. public museums dependent on central or local 
government), public autonomous museums, public outsourced museums and private museums.  
Our main findings highlight that the effectiveness of public autonomous and public outsourced 
museums is higher than that of governmental institutions run as sub-units of culture departments 
and with no financial autonomy. At the same time, private museums perform better than publicly 
owned and directly managed museums, but not as well as those public museums that have been 
outsourced or granted financial autonomy. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Sect. 2 discusses about museum performance. Sect. 3 
describes the research hypotheses on the institutional determinants we will test. Sect. 4 presents the 
Italian institutional context. Sect. 5 introduces data and empirical strategy. Section 6 presents results 
and discussion. Sect. 7 reports comments about robustness checks. Sect. 8 concludes. 
 
 
2. DEFINING AND MEASURING MUSEUMS’ PERFORMANCE 
 
Museums are either public or non-profit organizations, and as such conceptualizing and measuring 
their performance represents a major challenge (Pignataro 2003; Fernandez Blanco et al. 2012). 
According to Harrison (2000), when the museum sector started to be considered from an economic 
and managerial point of view, the main focus was on efficiency, and the number of visitors or 
revenues from admissions was the most common measure of output. This perspective has generated 
a stream of empirical literature, mainly adopting Data Envelopement Analysis (DEA) as preferred 
methodology (Basso and Funari 2004; Taheri and Ansari, 2013; Del Barrio and Herrero 2014). Yet 
the works applying such an approach usually analyse rather small datasets of museums and, with 
very few exceptions, the output does not take into account the qualitative and social aspects of the 
cultural services provided. Moreover, when visitors are considered as a proxy of output, this 
variable may be either flawed by endogeneity problems vis a vis inputs, or it might be dependent on 
factors such as proximity to tourist resorts and attractions, which are clearly beyond a museum’s 
control. 
More recently effectiveness has become a major issue in the museum sector. Effectiveness is 
defined as the ability of a museum to generate values for society according to its mission and goals. 
It is a multi-dimensional concept as museums are expected to undertake different tasks, and their 
goals may relate to different stakeholders (Camarero and Garrido 2008). 
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In this paper we consider museums’ effectiveness in activities related to aspects as various as 
cultural dissemination of heritage, audience engagement and enhancement of tourism attractiveness.  
Specifically, we focus on museums’ ability to deliver services that enhance the satisfaction of 
visitors and the development of the local context (Camarero and Garrido 2008; Burton et al. 2009). 
Measuring museums’ effectiveness in education is not easy. Outcomes such as individual learning 
from visits may be hard to assess through surveys because visitors tend to report about their 
previous knowledge of the collections, in addition to what they actually learnt during their visit 
(Prentice et al. 1998). An alternative approach is to measure museums’ educational outcome 
through the assessment of individual satisfaction or perceived impact by stakeholders (Camarero 
and Garrido 2008; Camarero et al. 2011). However, the use of subjective measures of satisfaction is 
likely to be flawed by serious measurement biases (Boyne 2006).  
To avoid such potential shortcomings, we do not consider the final outcome of a museum. Instead, 
we use a large number of outputs, i.e., activities and aspects of a museum’s supply that target both 
tourists and visitors (both potential and actual), and whose aim is to make the museum more 
accessible, friendly and connected.2 Del Barrio et al. (2009) and Herrero-Prieto (2013) define the 
number of activities and aspects of a museum’s supply that we consider here as social impact, thus 
implicitly recognizing a close connection between these outputs and a museum’s final outcome.  
The underlying idea is that the more a museum engages in such activities, the more likely it is to 
accomplish its role as a cultural disseminator and catalyst of the local context.  
 
 
3. HYPOTHESES 
 
In the cultural economics literature, a museum’s ownership structure has been originally recognized 
as the main institutional factor affecting its incentives and operations (Frey and Pommerehne 1989; 
Benhamou 1998). While looking at the distinction between public and private museums, Frey and 
Pommerehne (1989) argue that, insofar as public grants cover their budget, public museums  have 
low incentives to search for alternative income sources and thus to pay attention to public 
preferences, engage in a business managerial style and in visitor-oriented activities. This situation is 
exacerbated when public museums are owned and directly controlled by government entities. When 
a centralized bureaucratic organization manages such institutions, it may be inefficient in both 
coordinating the diverse museum functions and in promoting visitor-oriented activities. Moreover, 
revenues from ticket sales or ancillary services usually do not accrue to individual public museums 
or their offices but are part of government revenues.  
Conversely, private museums relying more on private funding and revenue sources have greater 
incentives to engage in managerial practices and strategies to ensure the financial sustainability of 
the organization, with a view to developing an audience, offering amenities to visitors and striving 
to gain recognition from their various stakeholders (Frey and Meier 2006).  
Notwithstanding such theoretical considerations, there is little empirical evidence about the effect of 
ownership on the dimensions of museums’ performance. Using data from an international survey of 
                                                        
2 We are aware that some of the items we consider in measuring museums’ connectivity with the local environment are 
not often defined as outputs, but the term is here borrowed from the literature on public management (Boyne 2006), 
where a distinction is made between outputs and outcomes. 
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491 European museums, Camarero et al. (2011) only find that the amount of public funding has a 
significant and negative impact on museums’ capacity to embrace technological innovation, 
whereas they provide mixed evidence regarding the effect of museums’ publicness on their 
economic and social performance. 
We propose to test the following hypothesis regarding the relationship between museums’ 
publicness and their performance: 
 
H1: Private museums outperform public museums directly run by government entities 
in their mission to provide audience-oriented services for cultural dissemination and 
enhancement of the local context. 
 
While the performance of museums may vary depending on the type of ownership, a more nuanced 
distinction can be made within the organizational structure of public museums. Schuster (1998) 
suggests that in the museum sector, hybrid ownership and organizational arrangements have 
become more common and widespread than pure forms of public and private institutions. 
Therefore, different organizational arrangements within public museums are likely to perform 
differently. In particular, outsourcing and administrative decentralization may impact public 
museums’ effectiveness.  
Regarding outsourcing in the cultural sector, Schuster (1997) argues that the quality of the cultural 
and artistic experiences provided by cultural organizations is likely to improve. However, he finds 
remarkably little evidence to support this argument.  
From a theoretical viewpoint, the literature on incomplete contracts (Holmstrom and Milgrom 2011; 
Hart et al. 1997) suggests that efficiency gains may be expected from the outsourcing of public 
services to the private sector, whereas improvement in the quality of service provision depends 
mostly on the contractibility and measurability of the task/activity. Yet, the direct applicability of 
these tenets to the museum sector is arguable, as in most cases the service providers are non-profit 
organizations whose incentives are different from those of the for-profit ones assumed by the 
models – in fact, the former are more aligned to their public principal. Moreover, this stream of 
literature assumes that all the tasks that a principal outsources were previously produced in-house, 
whereas in museums’ outsourcing contracts the agent either is asked to increase the number of 
activities/services with respect to the present situation, or increases it out of a desire to do well. 
There is anecdotal evidence that outsourced public museums have expanded the availability of 
visitors’ amenities and improved commercial, non-mandated services, which allegedly represent 
those contractible activities that are more relevant for achieving audience development and 
engagement (Harrison 2000).  
Another channel through which outsourcing of public museum might allegedly increase service 
performance refers to the fact that changes in organizational models may also affect the financing 
mechanism of public organizations, a factor that can definitely influence service provision if it 
translates into richer budgets. The main private actors engaged in the provision of outsourced 
museum services are mission-oriented non-profit organizations; therefore, an argument in favour of 
outsourcing is private non-profit organizations’ ability to attract higher financial resources (through 
donations) than just the revenues of service delivery (Hansmann, 1981).  
Our second hypothesis is therefore the following: 
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H2 Outsourced public museums are more effective than public museums directly run by 
government entities. 
  
Another change in the organizational structure of public museums that is likely to affect 
performance stems from administrative decentralization in public service provision. While the 
concept of decentralization in the public administration literature has different nuances (Dubois and 
Fattore 2009), here we define it as the transfer of administrative and financial responsibility from 
central or local government entities to the museums themselves. Besley and Gathak (2003) develop 
an interpretative framework relating decentralization and effectiveness. They suggest that 
decentralized government provision may be a superior solution compared to both pure market and 
traditional state provision. Such a result stems from the fact that with decentralized provision, the 
single units endowed with managerial and financial autonomy within public organization benefit 
from the allocative role of matching providers, customers and workers. This leads to performance 
improvements due to better alignment of the mission preferences of all stakeholders, and attenuates 
incentive problems. 
Hence our third hypothesis is formulated as follows:  
 
H3 Public museums with managerial and financial autonomy are more effective than 
public museums directly run by government entities. 
 
 
4. MUSEUMS: THE ITALIAN CONTEXT 
 
Traditionally, culture in Italy has been considered to be a public sector domain of intervention 
focused mainly on heritage (Bodo and Bodo, 2014).3 Along with monuments and archaeological 
sites, museums have always played a major role in public spending for heritage, which in turn is the 
main item within public cultural spending. Direct management by national or local governments 
was the only organizational model of museum policy until the mid-Nineties. Within the public 
sector, museums were not managed as autonomous units, and they did not have their own budgets. 
They were in fact sub-units of culture departments, with no own spending powers or revenues, and 
ticket sales and sponsorships would accrue to the general budget of the level of government that 
managed them. All decisions not pertaining to the strictly cultural domain were taken by the 
politically elected head of the culture department (and approved by the legislature) or by 
bureaucrats.   
As Dalle Nogare and Bertacchini (2015) illustrate, all this began to change in the mid-Nineties due 
to the new ideological atmosphere and the necessity to shrink public expenditure to meet the 
Maastricht criteria.4 In 1997, the Pompei archaeological site was granted some limited form of 
                                                        
3
 The levels of government most involved in delivering cultural services are central government and municipalities, the 
former with a Ministry of Culture, the latter with their own culture departments. 
4
 The new European law fostering the outsourcing of public economic services of general interest also had an impact, as 
it triggered a general trend towards outsourcing in Italy.  
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autonomy by central government, soon followed by the central government-owned museums of 
Florence, Rome and Venice, which were gathered in national museum poles (poli museali 
autonomi). In 2004, the National Egyptian Museum in Turin was handed over to a public-private 
foundation. Public museums belonging to local governments, universities and other public 
institutions have also experimented with new organizational models, though such changes have 
been only sketchily documented (Benedikter, 2004; Ponzini, 2010).  
The shift towards new organizational modes has thus been going on for about twenty years. The 
process has exhibited substantial variability over time and levels of government. Resistance has 
been strong, both by a share of the directors and especially by the unionized employees, particularly 
against the outsourcing trend. Because of this resistance, almost all new organizational 
arrangements have not entailed a complete break with the past. Those museums that have been 
granted greater autonomy still depend on decisions made at the ministry/culture department level in 
many crucial respects, such as number of employees and wages. More often than not, the 
outsourcing option has turned into contracting-in or at best the handing over of museum 
management to newly created public-private institutions, making it hard to regard this trend as a 
real process of destatization.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the new organizational arrangements have substantially affected 
the operation of public museums. Autonomous museums can retain their revenues (including 
sponsorships and concession fees derived from outsourcing auxiliary services), which allows them 
to do some programming and budgeting. Outsourced museums’ greater autonomy in programming 
and budgeting is complemented by greater attractiveness to donors.5 Whether all this translates into 
improved museum performance is an open question.  
 
 
5. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Empirical model and data 
Our model is the following:   
   
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖
′𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖
′𝑋𝑖 
  
where 𝑦𝑖  is the value of an index expressing the effectiveness of museum i in its mission to 
disseminate culture and promote the local cultural context ; 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑖  is the set of our variables of 
interest accounting for the museum’s form of ownership and organizational structure and 𝑋𝑖 is a set 
of controls relative to the characteristics of the museum and the area where it is located. To translate 
it into an empirical model we add an error term with standard characteristics (zero mean, constant 
variance). 
Our research exploits the rich information collected by Istat, the Italian National Statistical Office, 
in 2011 through a museum census covering all Italian museums and cultural heritage institutions 
                                                        
5 Outsourced museums also have the advantage conferred by the fact that new employees may be hired using private 
market employment contracts, which are characterized by greater flexibility. However, unless it is the case of a newly 
opened museum, the service provider is usually asked to employ the current staff at the same conditions as before. This 
implies that a reduction in the cost of staff is not to be expected, on average, in the short run.  
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(Indagine sui musei e le istituzioni similari). Archaeological sites, monuments and other institutions 
similar to museums are also included. Notably, the census includes questions concerning the type 
and characteristics of services and activities provided by the organization, which we use to 
elaborate performance indices. Istat provides these data after a process of anonymization. The 
sample size is 2517 museums with complete information on selected variables. 
 
Dependent variables 
We operationalize museums’ effectiveness by using output measures of a museum’s service supply 
related to improvements in audience experience and enhancement of the relationship with the local 
context.  
The Italian museum census includes questions on the availability of services and activities that are 
directly or indirectly related to these organizational goals. We selected and classified them within 
four dimensions: 
1) actual accessibility (ACCESS); 
2) facilitation of experience (FRIENDLINESS); 
3) visibility outside the premises, with special emphasis on web visibility (WEB); 
4) mindfulness of local context and connection with other local institutions, both cultural and 
touristic (LOCALNET). 
Table 1 summarizes the questions included within the four dimensions. 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
  
The first two dimensions (ACCESS, FRIENDLINESS) are directly related to the capacity of a 
museum to affect the quality of visitors’ experience.  
Museum accessibility, expressed in terms of opening days and schedule, is indicative of a 
museum’s attitude towards cultural dissemination. All the museums of our sample were open in 
2011, but not all of them had a predetermined opening time – some would just open upon request. 
Another question we consider is special night openings, which are one of the best signals of a 
museum’s commitment to audience involvement.  
FRIENDLINESS is about those visitors’ amenities and services in a museum that enable to grasp 
the meaning of its collections and exhibitions. It captures the availability of facilities and activities 
such as laboratories or performances. It is the result of a large number of questions and explores all 
the aspects of a museum’s supply that condition a visitor’s experience and satisfaction. It is about 
both the core mission of a museum (cultural dissemination) and the provision of auxiliary services 
that may play an important role, especially in the experience of constantly occasional museum 
visitors (Brida et al. 2016).  
Regarding the last two dimensions (WEB, LOCALNET), a high value is likely to be indirect 
evidence of the presence of strategies aimed at audience development. WEB measures a museum’s 
strategy of web visibility, which fosters dissemination of knowledge about the museum’s 
collections. It may also be intended as a measure of the attitude towards innovation in 
communication, because it is constructed from questions about Internet visibility, presence on 
social media, and availability of an institution’s own apps.  
LOCALNET summarizes a museum’s attitude towards, and relationships with, both local audiences 
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and local cultural and tourism industry. Thus, it focuses on a museum’s ability to promote the local 
cultural context through its reputation, loyalty building and collective marketing strategies. One 
question is about the presence of volunteers and civil service workers, which might signal the effort 
of a museum’s director to involve the local community.  
The answers to the binary questions within each of the four dimensions are transformed into 
dummy variables – presence/absence of that given service/characteristic. An index for each 
dimension is simply the count of the declared characteristics.  
The proxy for overall effectiveness (OVERALL) combines all four dimensions as sum of ACCESS, 
FRIENDLINESS, WEB and LOCALNET. In principle, there exists a large number of alternative 
methods to synthetise binary variables in one single index. They differ in both the way they weight 
each binary indicator and in the selection of the aggregating function. For instance, one can rely on 
techniques based on extracting latent variables, like Multiple Correspondence Analysis, which 
indeed has been widely used (Greenacre and Blasius 2006). However, given the high number of 
dichotomous variables we consider in our study, this approach would provide hard-to-interpret 
dimensions. As to the interpretability of our regression coefficients, using extracted dimensions as 
dependent variables would make it harder. In fact, with our counting method the coefficients are 
simply the increase in the number of provided services.  
It might be argued that not all the services we consider equally contribute to a museum’s 
effectiveness. Moreover, our aggregating function produces an OVERALL index in which the 
dimensions with a higher number of indicators are overweighted. In order to test if these 
shortcomings affect the sign and significance of our estimates we also constructed a second 
indicator of overall effectiveness (OVERALLnorm) using a different weighting system. The new 
indicator is obtained from a 0-1 normalisation of each dimension, and the subsequent sum of the 
four indices. OVERALLnorm is then a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 4. This alternative 
dependent variable gives the same weight to each dimension, and allows each single binary 
indicator to weight less if it is part of a dimension with a higher number of variables (weights are 
equal to the reciprocal of the maximum number of services in each dimension). As we will see, the 
use of OVERALLnorm in place of OVERALL does not alter the results for our target variables 
significantly. 
 
Regressors 
The explanatory variables of interest measure ownership type and organizational structure of 
museums. We distinguish between four types of museums: 
- Governmental museums (reference category) are owned and managed by a central or local 
government as a section of a culture department and have no own budget; 
- Autonomous museums (AUTO) are owned by a central or local government, but they have 
their own budget, thus denoting some independence in strategies and decisions; 
- Outsourced museums (OUTS) are owned by a central or local government, but they are 
managed by a contractor; 
- Private museums (PRI) are privately owned. 
The category of Outsourced museums refers to museums in which the general management of the 
institution is contracted out. Private includes all museums whose owner is a private subject, and 
includes also public-private institutions such as QUANGOs, as they operate under private law 
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regime.  
Regarding other covariates, we consider what follows. 
● A dummy for the type of museum (TYMUS) that equals 1 if “gallery or museum” is the 
only or prevalent type or nature of the institution – the reference category is monuments or 
archaeological sites. The reason is that different types of institutions may be differently 
suitable for hosting some of the considered activities and visitors’ amenities. 
● Whether the museum was opened before 1946 (Y46) and (log of) the surface of the 
museum (logSUR). Y46 controls for oldest museums, which are likely to be museums of 
fine art or antiquities and located in historic buildings whose structural conditions might 
hinder the provision of some of the specific services under consideration. Conversely, 
more recently established museums are more likely to offer services to their visitors or to 
have more relations with the local context. Furthermore, Y46 may also be interpreted as a 
control for the historical/artistic relevance of a collection, which is also partly controlled 
for by logSUR. 
● Number of employees (NEMP). In the Italian context this variable is exogenous with 
respect to other managerial choices, such as the number of services offered, at least in 
public museums. Even when public museums are granted autonomy or outsourced, all 
decisions regarding staff are seldom under the direct control of a museum’s director. The 
opposite circumstance might induce a suspicion of reverse causation here, but the 
institutional setup rules it out. 
● Number of employees per surface unit (EMPSUR) and squared EMPSUR (EMPSUR2). 
EMPSUR controls for nonlinearities in the combination of given quantities of inputs, and 
its square accounts for eventual overcrowding effects.  
●  (log of) the population of the province where the museum is located, NUTS3 level 
(logPOP – Istat, 2016a) and (log of) the number of beds in accommodation facilities of the 
province, NUTS3 level  (logBED – Istat, 2016b). They control for potential local and 
tourist audiences. We use the number of beds in accommodation facilities instead of tourist 
flows in order to avoid reverse causation problems, though recent evidence shows that in 
Italy tourism causes museum visits and not vice versa (Cellini and Cuccia, 2013). 
● Whether the museum is part of an organized network of museums (NETMUS). Being part 
of a museum network may imply some scale economies in the provided services, or cost 
savings in administrative functions that may translate to more resources for activities 
targeted at the audience and the local community. 
● The number of museums in the same municipality (NMUS). Albeit not allegedly crucial as 
a factor influencing museums’ service supply, it controls for potential competition 
pressure.6 Competition may affect museums in two ways. On the one hand, competition for 
visitors should trigger museums to offer activities and services to increase their 
effectiveness as cultural disseminators. On the other hand, competition for local funding 
might mean a smaller budget and thus a relative decrease in the variety of services and 
activities provided. It is important to control for competitive pressure to disentangle the 
pure organizational change effect from the confounding effect of one of its possible 
                                                        
6
 All museums in the same municipality have been considered, also those not included in the sample.  
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consequences, i.e., a change in the degree of competition after adopting a model of service 
provision based on decentralized or outsourced museums. 
● Dummies for the Italian regions, NUTS2 level. 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
Econometric strategy 
As already illustrated, our response variables are the result of a process of counting the number of 
services provided by each museum. Consequently, we decided to regress our explanatory variables 
through standard count data models. As the target variable may report problems of overdispersion 
and in some cases of inflation of zeros, we initially considered two models, namely, Poisson and 
Negative Binomial, plus their version for zero-inflated distributions. The selection of the most 
appropriate model was driven by the comparison of several criteria, as Vuong (1989), LR and 
goodness-of-fit tests, information criteria, and quasi-Poisson’s theta assessment (Cameron and 
Trivedi 1998).7 
 
 
6. RESULTS 
 
In what follows, we will first discuss the results for overall performance (OVERALL, Table 3) and 
then present evidence about the four indicators composing it (Table 4). 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
Overall effectiveness  
  
Table 3, columns 1-4 show the estimates of models using the overall index of museum effectiveness 
(OVERALL) as dependent variable. For all specifications, the Negative Binomial was found to be 
the best choice.  
Model 1 considers only the three ownership and organizational mode variables as covariates. There 
is clear evidence that autonomous and outsourced museums are associated with higher values for 
the dependent variable: the relative coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, while surprisingly, private museums do not seem to differ substantially, as far as performance 
is concerned, from governmental museums, the reference category. Coefficient of autonomous 
museums is higher than that associated with outsourced ones. The incidence risk ratios (IRR) for 
these two organizational forms8 indicate that being an autonomous or outsourced public museum 
leads to an increase of, respectively, 33.91% and 14.91% in the overall performance indicator 
relative to the reference category of governmental museums. Including regional dummies (Model 2) 
does not change the picture: the organizational structure effect is robust and sizable. 
When we include museum-specific controls (Model 3), both the statistical significance and sign of 
                                                        
7
 These tests are available upon request. 
8
 The exp of each coefficient gives the incidence risk ratios (IRR), which is 1.3391 for AUTO and 1.1491 for OUTS. 
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our variables of interest persist, whereas the coefficient of both AUTO and OUTS become much 
more similar. All controls are significant and with the expected sign, except for the dummy 
capturing whether the museum opened before 1946. In particular, being a large museum (logSUR) 
with many employees (NEMP) increases the number of provided services; the same can be said for 
museums (TYMUS) compared to monuments or archaeological sites. Our control for the adequacy 
of personnel conditionally to the surface of the museum (EMPSUR) has a positive and non-linear 
impact, meaning positive but diminishing returns as an employee is added to a single surface unit, 
which depicts possible overcrowding effects.  
Model 4 adds environmental controls, namely, the number of museums in the same municipality, 
whether the museum is part of a museum network, (log of) provincial population and (log of) the 
number of available beds in the accommodation facilities of the province. Sign, significance and 
even size of the coefficients of both OUTS and AUTO are not affected by the inclusion of the 
environmental controls. Instead PRI turns significant and positive, indicating a significantly higher 
effectiveness of these institutions than that of governmental museums, though not as high as that of 
both autonomous and decentralized ones. As expected, the evidence of a positive impact of 
competition pressure (NMUS) on performance is very weak, while that of being part of a museum 
network is strong. The impact of the size of the potential local audience (logPOP) is positive and 
significant. Interestingly, the impact of potential tourist audience (logBED) is negative. The 
difference in significance between the impact of residents and tourists may be due to a difference in 
the way museum managers consider these two types of audiences. Residents are likely to return to a 
museum, and accordingly it is important to build a reputation based on the provision of services – 
which is not the case when one considers tourists. The negative sign of logBED may suggest that in 
places where tourism is more developed museums have no incentive to be attractive, since tourists’ 
decision to visit them depends whether they are considered icons or not.9 
As the overall performance indicator is constructed using a large number of dummies, the support 
of its distribution is large enough to use OLS on our full model as a check for robustness (Model 5). 
It is reassuring to note that results are very similar to Model 4 in terms of significance and sign. As 
to the controls, the only difference is that now our measure of competition pressure is slightly 
significant, hinting that the positive effect of competition for audiences in raising museums’ 
performance may be stronger than the potential negative effect arising from competition for 
financial resources.   
OLS was also used in testing whether using the alternative dependent variable OVERALLnorm 
leads to different results. AUTO, OUTS and PRI have the same statistical significance, sign and 
coefficients’ relative size as in Model 4; the same is true for most controls. 
All in all, the most important finding conveyed by Table 3 is that there is robust evidence that when 
we consider performance, the organizational mode matters: public museums that have been granted 
autonomy or have been outsourced outperform governmental museums. Hence, Hypothesis 2 and 
Hypothesis 3 are confirmed. Private museums outperform governmental ones if all relevant controls 
are accounted for, but not in the same sizable way. This means that private museums’ effectiveness 
is not as high as that of public autonomous and outsourced museums. We can therefore say that 
Hypothesis 1 is confirmed, but whether private museums do better than public ones depends on the 
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 There is evidence that in Italy art exhibitions affect tourist flows in a negligible way (Di Lascio et al. 2011). 
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organizational form of the latter.  
The evidence for private museums is puzzling, and we have only tentative explanations. Indeed, 
Italian private museums are a miscellany of very different types of institutions. Many are owned by 
the Catholic Church, which has a very peculiar nature. The organizational mission of its museums 
may be different from cultural dissemination and especially local promotion. Additionally, a fairly 
large number of private museums are brand museums. In recent years, firms of all sizes have 
opened their own museums and galleries containing archive material and explaining the production 
of the good they supply. They tend not to have a fixed opening time or many relations with the local 
community, as they are often meant as part of a B2B marketing strategy.  
 
<Table 4 about here> 
 
Single dimensions 
Table 4 summarizes results obtained from using each of the four sub-indeces as dependent variable. 
The selected counting model for each of them is reported in the Table. 
ACCESS (Model 7) shows the smallest number of significant covariates. It is not significantly 
explained by the ownership type or the organizational mode of a museum. Autonomous, outsourced 
and private museums seem not to differ significantly from governmental ones with respect to 
accessibility.  
Estimates for FRIENDLINESS, WEB and LOCALNET (Models 8 to 10) all show robust evidence 
that both autonomous and outsourced public museums outperform governmental ones. Private 
institutions do not stand out as significantly different from the reference category when one 
considers their visitor friendliness, whereas their coefficient is positive in the WEB and 
LOCALNET regressions, though the coefficient is much smaller than that of public autonomous 
and outsourced museums.  
Overall, we can conclude that considering museum effectiveness in specific operational contexts 
makes a difference: 
- Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 are confirmed when one considers performance in terms of web 
visibility and relation to the local context. 
- Hypotheses 2 and 3 are confirmed when one considers visitor friendliness, while Hypothesis 
1 is not confirmed. 
- Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 are not confirmed when one considers accessibility.  
 
 
7. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
 
Results from a series of robustness checks are reported in Table 5.  
One concern about our results is the statistical independence of the dummies we use in the 
construction of our dependent variables. In particular, the two items “cafeteria and restaurant” and 
“bookshop”, when present in a museum, imply a profit-making activity that could make a museum 
more capable of supporting a higher number of non-profit-making activities and services. We 
therefore re-ran our baseline regression (Model 4) using another dependent variable that excludes 
the two items in question from the overall performance indicator (Model 11). The results do not 
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change much; the point estimates of AUTO and OUTS are somewhat smaller yet positive and 
significant.   
Another point of concern regards our controls for the relevance of the museum collection, namely, 
Y46 and logSUR. These may not fully capture a museum’s attractiveness for visitors, which is an 
important control for the number of services a museum offers. However, if we proxy attractiveness 
with the number of visitors on the right-hand side of our model, a reverse causation problem may 
arise, because visitors may be more attracted by museums providing more services and amenities. 
We argue however that this may not be the case for foreign visitors, who usually visit museums 
mostly because of the fame of their masterpieces. We therefore use the share of foreign visitors on 
total visitors (FOREIGN) as an extra covariate in our full model.10 In Model 12 we observe very 
few changes with respect to Model 4, with FOREIGN being positive but only marginally 
significant, revealing that age and surface are probably sufficient to account for the relevance of a 
museum’s collection. 
Finally, in Model 4 we found that being a private museum affects performance positively, but 
apparently the performance of Italian private museums is lower than that of Italian public 
autonomous and outsourced museums. Since most private museums are not-for-profit institutions, 
we expected that private and public outsourced museums would be associated with similar service 
performance, but this does not emerge from our estimates. One possible explanation for this result 
may be found in the peculiarities of the Italian context regarding the category of private museums, 
which are mostly owned by religious organizations, whose mission might arguably be more 
concerned with preservation of the collections than with providing public services to enhance 
audience access and experience. Thanks to a specific question in the census data we use, we are 
able to distinguish between museums belonging to the Catholic Church (PRIrelig) and other private 
museums (PRInorelig). Model 13 reports the results of our modified baseline model. The estimated 
coefficient of PRIrelig is negative, whereas that of PRInorelig is positive, and both are significant, 
thus confirming our thesis. Note however that the point estimate for PRInorelig is half that for 
AUTO and smaller than that for OUTS, revealing that private museums in Italy are not, on average, 
top performers. This is evidence needs further investigation.  
Finally, it might be argued that there is a possible different reading of our findings. As the decision 
to decentralize or outsource is a discretionary choice, central and local governments may decide to 
give autonomy to or outsource only those museums that have a greater potential to attract visitors 
and tourists. In other words, there may be a problem of reverse causation: it is not the organizational 
structure that influences the number and variety of services provided but rather the number of 
services, a proxy for attractiveness, that determines the organizational structure.  
We have, however, reasons to believe that reverse causality is not a concern in this context. Firstly, 
central government has indeed implemented a reform that granted financial and administrative 
autonomy in a selective way: only its most attractive museums have been decentralised. However, 
this has occurred after our reference year. Secondly, there is some evidence that selectivity has not 
guided local governments’ outsourcing decisions regarding their museums. From the analysis of the 
Home Office data on municipalities’ outsourcing, it emerges that when a municipality owns more 
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than one museum, it tends to outsource all of them, regardless their number of visitors.  
 
 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Museums are for preserving and showing their collections, to which a community attributes a 
symbolic meaning that reinforces both individual and collective identity. They are often also tourist 
attractors, and in both roles they are important for the positive externalities they produce. This 
explains why their service provision has a relevant public good component; thus, the issue of 
museum performance is often considered within the context of the debate on public service 
providers’ performance. 
This contribution investigates which type of museum ownership structure and organization is best 
in terms of effectiveness, concentrating on museums as culture disseminators and catalysts of the 
local context. We proxy museums’ effectiveness with the number of services and activities they set 
up in order to play those roles. We carefully control for a number of museum-specific and context-
specific determinants of performance and for potential audience.  
Our estimates highlight the fact that service performance in public autonomous and public 
outsourced museums is higher than that in public museums run as sub-units of governmental 
culture departments with no financial autonomy. The impact of being decentralized or 
outsourced is not only positive, but also sizable. We read this finding as evidence that 
decentralization and outsourcing have positive consequences in the number and diversity of 
services and activities museums provide to fulfil their mission as cultural disseminators and 
promoters of the local cultural and tourist context.  
A policy recommendation that governmental museums should be outsourced or granted more 
financial autonomy does not immediately follow, however, because nothing can be argued 
here about the quality of the provided services. Yet the impact of decentralisation and 
outsourcing on quality, upon which most of the literature has so far insisted, is not the only 
element to consider when it comes to the design of a multi-output service provision. In fact, 
what our evidence shows is that the number of activities/services provided by a museum vary 
according to its organisational mode. Number and quality of the provided services must be 
jointly considered, a task we leave for future research. 
A second interesting finding of our analysis is that the different performance dimensions we 
consider are affected by a museum’s organizational structure in different ways. Accessibility seems 
not to be influenced at all, while all other dimensions (visitor amenities, web visibility and local 
network) confirm that autonomous and outsourced museums outperform governmental ones. The 
impacts of being autonomous and outsourced are similar in the case of visitor friendliness and 
relations with the local context, while in the case of web visibility, being an autonomous museum 
has a larger impact on performance than being outsourced. This may also hint at different attitudes 
towards new communication technologies by the two museum organizational types. 
Finally, according to our evidence, Italian private museums do not seem to be very effective – 
though they do better than public museums that are run as sub-units of culture departments – and 
this is true even if we control for Church ownership. This may be specific of the Italian context; 
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further investigation on other countries’ museums is needed to clarify this point.  
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Table 1 - Performance dimensions and related dichotomic items of the questionnaire 
Dimension-subdimension Item 
ACCESS    
Opening time policy, predefined timetable (ref. 
opening upon request)  
Open all year (except holidays)   
Evening or night openings   
FRIENDLINESS    
Informational devices  info point 
  info poster at entrance 
  map at entrance with visiting paths 
  presence of brochures 
  posters or captions describing single displays 
  Audio- and/or video guides and/or multimedia booths 
  signs highlighting visiting paths 
  paths and info material dedicated to children 
  info material for disabled people (braille) 
  info poster at entrance on local context 
Facilities ticket pre-sale/reservation of visit 
  cloakroom 
  cafeteria and restaurant 
  bookshop 
Guided visits  
Didactic activities   
Performances and similar events   
WEB    
Website   
Online catalogue for visitors   
Online scientific catalogue for scholars   
Access to single selected heritage pieces   
App   
Teaching/gaming section in website   
Online library   
Online ticket purchase   
Virtual visit   
Online calendar of events   
Newsletter   
Social media   
Wi-Fi access   
LOCALNET    
Presence of volunteers or "civil service" 
employees   
Presence of "friends of" clubs   
Part of structured cultural paths   
Brochures of local cultural and touristic 
organizations   
Advertising campaigns dedicated to locals   
Partnerships with other local cultural 
institutions    
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Table 2 – Summary statistics for response variables and regressors 
Variable Acronym Mean Standard 
deviation 
% 
(dummy=yes) 
Effectiveness: overall OVERALL 17.3 6.7   
Effectiveness: actual accessibility ACCESS 2.1 0.9   
Effectiveness: facilitation of 
experience 
FRIENDLINESS 8.8 3.7   
Effectiveness: visibility WEB 2.4 2.3   
Effectiveness: local context LOCALNET 3.9 1.5   
Autonomous museums (dummy) AUTO     7.0 
Outsourced museums (dummy) OUTS     19.1 
Private museums (dummy) PRI     37.7 
Number of museums within the 
same municipality 
NMUS 8.9 19.2   
The institution is a gallery or a 
museum (dummy) 
TYMUS     86.4 
The museum is part of an organized 
network of museums or similar 
institutions, for the sharing of 
human, financial or technological 
resources (dummy) 
NETMUS     49.7 
The museum was opened before 
1946 (dummy) 
Y46     11.2 
Surface, square meters SUR 3560.7 35563.8   
Number of employees NEMP 10.4 24.9   
Number of beds in accommodation 
facilities of the province (NUTS3) 
BED 38725.2 46247.9   
Population of the province (NUTS3) POP 810344.5 900317.2   
Employees/surface ratio * 100 EMPSUR 3.1 7.5   
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Table 3 – Overall effectiveness, results. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Model,  
dependent variable 
Negative binomial, OVERALL 
OLS,  
OVERALL 
OLS, 
OVERALLnor
m 
AUTO 
0.292*** 0.279*** 0.193*** 0.194*** 3.675*** 0.341*** 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.471) (0.050) 
OUTS 
0.139*** 0.143*** 0.167*** 0.171*** 2.869*** 0.268*** 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.334) (0.035) 
PRI 
0.013 0.012 0.023 0.058*** 0.975*** 0.073** 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.275) (0.029) 
Regional dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TYMUS 
  0.184*** 0.187*** 3.246*** 0.312*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.348) (0.037) 
Y46 
  0.009 0.0001 0.089 0.074* 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.377) (0.040) 
logSUR 
  0.120*** 0.113*** 1.823*** 0.186*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.098) (0.010) 
NEMP 
  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.027*** 0.003*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.005) (0.001) 
EMPSUR 
  0.009*** 0.009*** 0.116*** 0.016*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.028) (0.003) 
EMPSUR2 
  -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.001*** -0.0001*** 
  (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.0002) (0.00002) 
NMUS 
   0.001 0.012* 0.001 
   (0.0004) (0.007) (0.001) 
NETMUS 
   0.148*** 2.430*** 0.261*** 
   (0.015) (0.241) (0.025) 
logBED 
   -0.021** -0.303* -0.026 
   (0.010) (0.167) (0.018) 
logPOP 
   0.033** 0.541** 0.035 
   (0.015) (0.239) (0.025) 
Constant 
2.793*** 2.869*** 1.895*** 1.553*** -4.127 0.119 
(0.013) (0.031) (0.055) (0.166) -2.706 (0.286) 
Observations 2,517 2,517 2,517 2,517 2,517 2,517 
Log Likelihood 
-
8,372.714 
-8,313.743 -8,059.397 -8,005.486   
Theta 
9.850*** 10.652*** 15.478*** 16.957***   
(0.458) (0.511) (0.880) (1.011)   
AIC 
16,753.43
0 
16,673.490 16,176.790 16,076.970   
R2     0.308 0.289 
Adj. R2     0.299 0.280 
Residual 
SE     
5.616 
df = 2484 
0.594 
df = 2484 
F statistic     34.482*** 31.511*** 
iris-AperTO 
University of Turin’s Institutional Research Information System and Open Access Institutional 
Repository 
df = 32; 2484 df = 32; 2484 
Note – Standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: *** p< 0.01; ** p< 0.05; * p< 0.1. Set of dummies for Italian 
regions (NUTS 2) are included in each regression but not reported (reference category: Lazio). 
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Table 4 – Single effectiveness indeces, results. 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 4 
Type of 
model, 
dependent 
variable 
Poisson, 
ACCESS 
Negative binomial, 
FRIENDLINESS 
Zero-inflated negative 
binomial, WEB 
Poisson, 
LOCALNE
T 
Negative 
Binomial, 
OVERALL 
AUTO 
0.069 0.174*** 0.881 0.385*** 0.134*** 0.194*** 
(0.055) (0.029) (0.275) (0.059) (0.040) (0.028) 
OUTS 
0.035 0.175*** 0.212 0.285*** 0.163*** 0.171*** 
(0.041) (0.021) (0.143) (0.051) (0.029) (0.020) 
PRI 
-0.038 0.024 0.145 0.293*** 0.066*** 0.058*** 
(0.034) (0.018) (0.116) (0.043) (0.025) (0.017) 
Other 
covariates 
Regional dummies, TYMUS, Y46, logSUR, NEMP, EMPSUR, EMPSUR2, NMUS, NETMUS, 
logBED, logPOP, constant term 
Observations 2,517 2,517 2,517 2,517 2,517 
Log 
Likelihood 
-3,674.569 -6,556.483  -4,730.645 -4,635.869 -8,005.486 
theta  
50.461*** 
(10.338)    
16.957*** 
(1.011) 
AIC 7,415.139 13,178.970   9,337.737 16,076.970 
Note – Standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: *** p< 0.01; ** p< 0.05; * p< 0.1. Set of dummies for Italian 
regions (NUTS 2) are included in each regression but not reported (reference category: Lazio). 
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Table 5 – OVERALL, robustness checks, negative binomial regressions.  
 Model 4 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Description Full model 
Exclusion of 
revenue 
generating 
services in the 
dependent 
variable 
Inclusion of the 
share of foreign 
tourists as 
regressor 
Split of PRI between 
PRIrelig and 
PRInorelig 
AUTO 
0.194*** 0.188*** 0.195*** 0.197*** 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
OUTS 
0.171*** 0.159*** 0.174*** 0.172*** 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
PRI 
0.058*** 0.046*** 0.059***  
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018)  
FOREIGN 
  0.001*  
  (0.0004)  
PRIrelig 
   -0.075*** 
   (0.025) 
PRInorelig 
   0.107*** 
   (0.018) 
Other 
covariates 
Regional dummies, TYMUS, Y46, logSUR, NEMP, EMPSUR, EMPSUR2, NMUS, 
NETMUS, logBED, logPOP, constant term 
Constant 
1.553*** 1.560*** 1.534*** 1.560*** 
(0.166) (0.163) (0.169) (0.164) 
Observations 2,517 2,523 2,413 2,517 
Log 
Likelihood 
-8,005.486 -7,904.113 -7,670.647 -7,980.916 
theta 
16.957*** 
(1.011) 
18.787*** 
(1.203) 
17.170*** (1.052) 17.647*** (1.073) 
AIC 16,076.970 15,874.230 15,409.290 16,029.830 
Note –Standard errors in parenthesis. Signif. codes: *** p< 0.01; ** p< 0.05; * p< 0.1. Set of dummies for Italian 
regions (NUTS 2) are included in each regression but not reported (reference category: Lazio). 
 
 
